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Abstract 
 
 This study uses multivariate cointegration and variance decomposition 
techniques to investigate the causal relationship between government expenditures 
and economic growth for Egypt, Israel and Syria, for the past three decades. When 
testing for causality within a bivariate system of total government spending and 
economic growth, we find bi-directional causality from government spending to 
economic growth with a negative long-term relationship between the two 
variables. However, when testing for causality within a trivariate system – the 
share of government civilian expenditures in GDP, military burden and economic 
growth – we find that the military burden negatively affects economic growth for 
all the countries, and that civilian government expenditures cause positive 
economic growth in Israel and Egypt. 
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Introduction 
The relationship between government expenditure (aggregate as well as 
disaggregated into its major components including defense spending) and 
economic growth has attracted considerable interest among economists and policy 
makers.  
Empirical analyses of the impact of overall government expenditure on long-
run economic growth include, among others, Feder (1983), Landau (1983), Ram 
(1983, 1986), Grier and Tullock (1989), Romer (1989), Barro (1990, 1991), 
Levine and Renelt (1992), Devarajan et al. (1996), and Sala-i-Martin (1997). The 
majority of these studies used cross-section analysis to link measures of 
government spending with economic growth rates and produced mixed evidence; 
the most common results show that government expenditure is detrimental to 
economic growth. Most of the evidence emerged from cross-section growth 
regressions [à la Barro (1991)] that provided only pooled estimates of the effects 
of government expenditure on economic growth. Cross-country growth regressions 
do not capture the dynamics of the relationship between these two variables and 
disregard country-specific factors.  
Another pitfall of these studies is that when economic growth was regressed 
on a wide spectrum of variables, researchers interpreted a significant coefficient of 
the measure of government expenditure as a confirmation of causality from 
government spending to economic growth. However, a significant coefficient in 
this equation can be equally compatible with the Keynesian view – causality from 
government expenditure to growth, or with Wagner’s Law – from growth to 
government expenditure as well as with a bi-directional causality between the two 
variables. Typical growth regressions provide no insights into the direction of 
causality but rather focus on associating government spending and a host of 
variables with economic growth. Recently some empirical studies have begun 
testing for the direction of causality between government spending and economic 
growth by using time series data and applying Granger causality tests. The studies 
that used these techniques focused mainly on developed countries where long-term 
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series data are available. [Ahsan et al. (1989), Bharat et al. (2000), and Ghali 
(1998) among others] 
Cross-section growth regressions have been used to assess the relationship 
between military spending and economic growth. As when examining overall 
government spending, the evidence that emerged was mixed and subject to 
criticism due to the use of inappropriate empirical techniques. For example, Benoit 
(1973, 1978) used the Spearman rank order correlation and regression analysis to 
show that military spending positively affects economic growth in a sample of 44 
LDCs (less developed countries) between 1950-1965. However, most other studies 
found a negative effect of defense spending either directly [Fiani et al. (1984), 
Lim (1983)] or indirectly through their negative impact on saving, [Deger and 
Smith (1985)] investment, [Deger and Sen (1983)] or exports. [Rothschild (1977)] 
Biswas and Ram (1986) found no consistent, statistically significant connection 
between military spending and economic growth. Aware of the severe pitfalls of 
cross section analysis, Dakurah et al. (2001) used cointegration and error 
correction models to study the causal relationship between the military burden and 
economic growth for 62 countries and found no common causal relationship 
between military spending and growth among these countries. 
Among the countries that have received little attention in the empirical 
literature on the relationship between government expenditure and economic 
growth are the countries of the Middle East, which are characterized by large 
fiscal imbalances due to high expenditures and the vulnerability of government 
revenues to external shocks. Moreover, due to the long-standing Israeli-Arab 
conflict, the military burden, as proxied by the share of government spending 
devoted to military expenditures, is very high by international standards. Almost 
all of these countries have undertaken some fiscal adjustments – mainly through 
reducing expenditures. However, with the rapidly growing population and the 
vulnerability of revenues to external shocks, sustained per capita economic growth 
is still a major challenge. There is an increasing awareness among policymakers of 
the need to promote a macroeconomic environment that would be conducive to 
private investment and economic growth. Given the dominant role of the public 
sectors in Mid-East economies, especially in terms of the resources they control, 
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their contribution to output and their impact on economic incentives, public 
finance reform and reallocating expenditures to productive areas are important 
factors for coping with this challenge. [Eken et al. (1997)] Thus it is important to 
identify which government functions are productive and which are not. While 
there have been several attempts to investigate the relationship between military 
expenditures and economic growth for Mid-East countries, [Askari and Corbo 
(1974), Cohen and Ward (1996), DeRouen, K. (1995), Lebovic and Ishaq (1987), 
among others] to the best of our knowledge there have been no investigations of 
the causal relationship between the various components of government spending 
separated into productive and nonproductive spending and economic growth.  
Thus, the purpose of the present study is to fill this gap by modeling short-
run and long-run dynamic interactions between civilian and military government 
spending and economic growth, and by testing for the direction of causality 
between these variables for Egypt, Israel, and Syria. The reason for choosing these 
particular countries is that they are major participants in the Israeli-Arab conflict 
and thus endure substantial military burdens. Additionally, long-run data is 
available for these countries, which enable us to assess the causal relationships 
between aggregate and disaggregated government spending, and economic growth.  
To do so we used multivariate Johansen’s (1988) cointegration test and 
Granger causality tests. In particular, we modeled the relationship between real 
GDP growth, share of government civilian expenditures in GDP, and military 
expenses using a vector error-correction (VEC) model and test for the direction of 
Granger causality between these variables. We also assessed the relative 
importance of each variable in explaining changes in the growth rate of real GDP 
beyond the sample period by using variance decomposition and impulse-response 
functions. We pay particular attention to data stationarity, the choice of the 
optimal lag-length and testing for cointegration among the variables. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
theoretical framework of the relationship between the components of government 
expenditures and economic growth; Section 3 explains the empirical methodology 
we applied in this study; Section 4 presents the data and results; and Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
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Theoretical Background 
A subject of intense debate for economists has been whether the government 
should intervene to correct for short-run fluctuations in economic activity. While 
the Classical economists oppose intervention, the Keynesian school of thought 
advocates the use of fiscal policies to boost economic activity in times of 
recessions. Classical economists believe that market forces swiftly bring the 
economy to long-run equilibrium through adjustment in the labor market, while 
Keynesians allege that the assumed self-regulating mechanisms in the economy fail 
to lead the economy back to equilibrium mainly due to rigidities in the labor 
market. Thus, Keynesians prescribe expansionary fiscal policies to avoid long 
recessions.  
Classicals and Neoclassicals deem fiscal policies ineffective on the grounds 
of the well-known crowding-out phenomenon, i.e. as public spending rises, public 
goods are substituted for private goods, thus causing lower private spending on 
education, health, transportation and other goods and services. Furthermore, when 
governments borrow heavily to fund spending, pressures in the credit market result 
in higher interest rates which hamper private investment. In practice, the 
effectiveness of fiscal policies may be hindered by the relatively long time lags 
from recognizing a need for action until realizing the results of the policies.  
The argument that fiscal policies enhance economic growth has gained 
additional support with the introduction of new growth theories. Unlike the 
Neoclassical growth model as formulated by Solow (1956), which did not 
prescribe the channels through which government spending may influence long-run 
economic growth, the new growth theorists1 suggest that there is both a temporary 
effect from government intervention during the transition to equilibrium, and a 
possible long-term effect from government spending on economic growth.  
In order to examine the role of government in the economy, it is important 
to pinpoint the main areas and channels wherein government actions can affect 
economic growth by means of economic activity. Government actions may be 
                                 
1
 See Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). 
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beneficial because: 1) the government supplies pure public goods that constitute a 
sizeable component of the aggregate demand; 2) the government may own or 
operate enterprises and institutions that provide quasi-public or private goods; 3) 
regulations and controls imposed by the government can facilitate the protection of 
property rights and enhance allocative efficiency in the presence of externalities; 
4) income taxes and transfer payments affect income distribution and may create a 
more equitable society; 5) governments often act as facilitators in markets with 
asymmetric and imperfect information. [Poot (2000)]  
However, government actions may also retard economic activities. For 
example, competition between the less efficient public sector and the private 
sector in the credit market often leads to an increase in interest rates, which 
reduces private investment, and eventually hampers economic growth. Also, taxes 
imposed by the government can distort market prices and resource allocations. 
The arguments so far were that government expenditure has either a positive 
or negative effect on economic growth. Wagner’s (1890) law, on the other hand, 
suggests a different direction of causality between government spending and 
economic growth. It states that in the process of economic development, 
government spending tends to expand relative to national income. Three reasons 
are given to justify such a hypothesis: 1) public functions substitute for private 
activity; 2) economic development results in the expansion of cultural and welfare 
expenditures; 3) government intervention may be needed to manage and finance 
natural monopolies. In other words, expanding government spending is seen as the 
product of economic development and not vice versa. [Bird (1971)] 
To sum up, the Keynesian effect and Wagner’s law present two different 
positions concerning the relationship between economic growth and government 
spending. While according to the Keynesian approach causality runs from 
government spending to economic growth, Wagner’s law postulates that causality 
runs in the opposite direction.  
Apart from overall government expenditures, theoretically different functions 
may affect economic activity in different ways. Military spending can have an 
adverse affect on economic growth by crowding-out private investment. Higher 
military spending results in distorted resource allocation, and the diversion of 
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resources from productive activities to the accumulation of armaments and the 
maintenance of sizeable military forces. According to Benoit (1978), however, in 
LDCs only a small percentage of the decrease in military spending, if any at all, 
goes to productive investment. Therefore, reducing military spending will not 
necessarily increase economic growth. He further argues that in LDCs, military 
spending will increase growth through different channels; it may contribute to the 
civilian economy indirectly by providing education and vocational and technical 
training that can boost human capital. Military forces also engage in certain R&D 
and production activities that spread to the civilian sector. [Benoit (1973, 1978)]  
Military spending can also affect economic growth positively through an 
expansion of aggregate demand (the Keynesian effect). The resulting increased 
demand leads to the increased utilization of otherwise idle capital, higher 
employment and profits, and therefore higher investment, all of which cause 
economic growth. In contrast to Benoit, Joerding (1986) argues that causality runs 
from economic growth to military spending. He claims that a growing country 
may want to strengthen itself against foreign or domestic threats by increasing its 
military spending.  
In sum, the foregoing discussion suggests four possible causal relationships 
between economic growth and military expenditures: unidirectional causality from 
military expenditures to economic growth, or vice versa; bi-directional causality 
between the two variables; and finally, a lack of any causal relationship.  
In the following section we will describe the econometric methodology we 
apply to test for Granger causality between government civilian and military 
expenditures in Egypt, Israel and Syria. 
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Empirical Methodology 
 Standard Granger Causality (SGC)  
According to the Granger's (1969) approach, a variable y is caused by a 
variable x if y can be predicted better from past values of both y and x than from 
past values of y alone. For a simple bivariate model, we can test if x is Granger-
causing y by estimating Equation (1) and then test the null hypothesis in Equation 
(2) by using the standard Wald test. 
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Where µ is a constant and tu is a white noise process. Variable x is said to 
Granger-cause variable y if we reject the null hypothesis (2), where 12γ  is the 
vector of the coefficients of the lagged values of the variable x. Similarly, we can 
test if y causes x by replacing y for x and vise versa in Equation (1).  
The assumptions of the classical regression model require that both {xt} and {yt} 
be stationary and that errors have a zero mean and finite variance. In the presence 
of nonstationary variables, there might be what Granger and Newbold (1974) 
called a spurious regression, whereby the results obtained suggest that there are 
statistically significant relationships between the variables in the regression model 
when in fact all that is obtained is evidence of contemporaneous correlation rather 
than meaningful causal relations. Thus, before conducting causality tests, variables 
must be found to be stationary individually or, if both are nonstationary, they must 
be cointegrated. The series {xt} will be integrated of order d, that is, xt ~I(d), if it 
is stationary after differencing it d times. A series that is I(0) is stationary. To test 
for unit roots in our variables, we use the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. 
This test is based on an estimate of the following regression: 
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where 0a  is a drift; t represents a time trend; and p is a large enough lag 
length to ensure that tε  is a white noise process. Using the results of Dickey-
Fuller (1979), the null hypothesis that the variable x is nonstationary ( )0:0 =βH is 
rejected if β  is significantly negative. Since it has been shown that ADF tests are 
sensitive to lag lengths [Campbell and Perron (1991)] we determine the optimal 
lag length by using Akaike’s information criterion (AIC). 
The next step is to test for cointegration if the variables are nonstationary in 
their levels. Generally, a set of variables is said to be cointegrated if a linear 
combination of the individual series, which are I(d), is stationary. Intuitively, if xt 
~I(d) and yt ~I(d), a regression is run, such as: 
ttt xy εβ +=          (4) 
If the residuals, tε , are I(0), then xt and yt are cointegrated. We use 
Johansen’s (1988) approach, which allows us to estimate and test for the presence 
of multiple cointegration relationships, r, in a single-step procedure. A class of 
models that embodies the notion of correction has been developed and is referred 
to as the Error Correction Model (ECM). In general, an ECM derived from the 
Johansen test can be expressed as: 
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where ECTt-1 is the error correction term lagged one period, z is a third 
endogenous variable in the system; and kij ,β  describes the effect of the k-th lagged 
value of variable j on the current value of variable i; i,j=x,y,z. The itε  are 
mutually uncorrelated white noise residuals. 
Granger causality from variable j to variable i in the presence of 
cointegration is evaluated by testing the null hypothesis that 0
,
== ikij αβ  for all 
k in the equation where i is the dependent variable, using the standard Wald test. 
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By rejecting the null, we conclude that variable j Granger-causes variable i. These 
tests differ from the standard causality tests in that they include error correction 
terms (ECTt-1) that account for the existence of cointegration among the variables. 
At least one variable in Equations (5) to (7) should move to bring the relation 
back into equilibrium if there is a true economic relation, and therefore at least 
one of the coefficients of the error correction terms has to be significantly 
different from zero. [Granger (1988)]  
Data and Empirical Findings  
A. Data and definitions of variables 
 As a measure of government size, we use the ratio of total nominal 
government expenditures to nominal GDP expressed in the natural logarithm, 
LGY. LMY stands for the natural logarithm of the military burden (the ratio of 
military spending to GDP). In addition, LCGY is the natural logarithm of the ratio 
of civilian government expenditures to GDP. Finally, LGDP denotes the natural 
logarithm of real GDP. Government-expenditure data are taken from the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) 2001 CD-ROM. Military burden data are 
from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and real 
GDP data are taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2001 CD-
ROM. Our sample includes the following countries for the specified periods: 
Egypt (1975-1998), Israel (1967-1998), and Syria (1973-1998). To account for the 
possible effects of the reform policies in Israel in 1985 and in Egypt in 1991 we 
use two dummy variables – IL85 and EGY91 – that take the value zero prior to 
the reform and the value of one thereafter.  
 
B. Granger Causality Results 
The first step in our empirical work was to determine the degree of 
integration of each variable. The ADF test results are reported in Table 1 for the 
levels as well as for the first differences of each of the variables. The results 
show that for Israel and Syria, all variables are nonstationary – I(1) – in their 
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levels but are stationary in their first differences. For Egypt, the variables are of 
different integration orders where LGDP and LCGY are I(0) and LGY and LMY 
are I(1) in their levels; however all variables are I(0) in their first differences.  
The second step was to test for a cointegration relationship between the 
relevant variables. We test for cointegration for Israel and Syria but not for Egypt 
since the variables are of different integration orders and therefore cannot be 
cointegrated. Table 2 reports the results of Johansen’s maximum eigenvalue test 
( maxλ ). This test is first applied to a bivariate system that includes the ratio of 
total government spending to GDP and real GDP, and then it is applied to a 
trivariate system where the total government expenditure is disaggregated to 
civilian and military spending. Johansen’s maxλ tests show that one cointegration 
relationship between the variables exists for Israel and Syria, both in the bivariate 
and the trivariate systems. The bivariate cointegration results in Table 2 show that 
total government expenditures have a negative long-run relationship with economic 
growth in Israel and Syria. The negative outcome is consistent with earlier 
empirical studies where government expenditures were found to affect economic 
growth adversely when the standard OLS method was applied. On the other hand, 
the trivariate cointegration results in Table 2 show that the military burden affects 
long-run economic growth negatively in both countries, whereas civilian 
government expenditures affect economic growth positively in Israel, but 
negatively in Syria.  
Now that cointegration has been determined in the cases of Israel and Syria, 
we apply the ECM to detect the direction of causality between the variables. To 
test for causality in Egypt where variables are of different integration orders in 
levels and therefore are not cointegrated, we apply the standard Granger causality 
(SGC) in first differences. The main results of the causality tests from Tables 3 
and 4 can be summarized as follows: 
(a) In Table 3, where a bivariate system of total government 
expenditures and GDP was utilized, bidirectional long-run 
causality was detected in Israel and Syria by virtue of the 
significance of the lagged error terms. As we mentioned, the 
long-run relationship between these two variables is negative. For 
 12 
Egypt we detected short-term unidirectional causality from 
economic growth to government spending.  
(b) In Table 4, for Egypt bidirectional causality between civilian 
government spending and economic growth was detected but no 
causality from the military burden to either of these two variables 
is evident. For Israel there was short and long-run causality from 
both military and civilian government spending to economic 
growth, and from both economic growth and military burden to 
civilian government expenditures. For Syria long-run causality 
from military and civilian government expenditures to economic 
growth, and from economic growth and military expenditures to 
civilian government expenditures was detected.  
(c) To control for economic reforms in Israel in 1985 and in Egypt 
in 1991 we added dummy variables that take the value zero up 
to the year 1985 in Israel and up to the year1991 in Egypt and 
the value one thereafter. However, no significant changes occur 
and so results were not reported.  
(d) Military burden is exogenous to economic growth and to 
government civilian expenditures in Egypt and Syria as we can 
see from Table 4, where the Wald statistic results in the LMY∆  
equation are insignificant even at the 10% level. However, in 
Israel, the military burden is constrained by government civilian 
expenditures and to a lesser extent by short-run economic growth. 
 
To sum up, our findings support a mutual causal relationship between 
government spending and economic growth. The strength of the relationship and 
its sign is a function of the model specification. Using a bidirectional framework, 
we obtained the usual results of a negative relationship between government 
spending and economic growth. Breaking down total government spending into 
civilian and military components revealed that the negative relationship could be 
attributed mainly to military burdens: in the three cases analyzed, the military 
burdens are detrimental to economic growth. This supports Lebovic and Ishaq 
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(1987) findings that the military burdens in Middle-East countries were major 
causes of slow growth during the years 1973-1982.  
Government nonmilitary expenditures, on the other hand, are not necessarily 
bad for economic growth. In Israel, a country with a less centralized economy 
than Egypt and Syria, civilian expenditures positively affect economic growth. A 
positive, but only marginally significant, short-term causality from civilian 
spending to economic growth was detected in Egypt. The relationship, however is 
different for Syria. Nonmilitary spending negatively affected long-run economic 
growth in Syria. This can be explained at least in part by the unproductive use of 
these resources. Therefore, it is not enough to mobilize military to nonmilitary 
spending; reallocation of these civilian expenditures from unproductive to 
productive spending is required to achieve higher growth rates.  
Another important finding is that neither economic growth nor civilian 
government spending caused a military burden, supporting earlier studies that 
military spending in the Middle East is determined mainly by regional or internal 
threats.  
 
C. Results of variance decompositions and impulse-response functions 
The empirical findings above reveal that while causality between government 
civilian spending and economic growth is bidirectional, negative unidirectional 
long-term causality from military burdens to economic growth is evident in the 
three countries. The objective of this section is to determine the relative 
importance of each variable in explaining output growth-rate beyond the sample 
period for each of the three countries. We do this by using variance 
decomposition and impulse response functions (IRFs). 
Considering the VEC model in Equations 5-7, a change in any one of the 
random innovations zyxiit ,,, =ε  will immediately change the value of the 
dependent variable and thus the future values of the other two variables through 
the dynamic structure of the system. Since an innovation in each of the three 
variables produces changes in the future growth of the real GDP, it is possible to 
break down the forecast-error variance of economic growth in each future period 
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and to determine the percentage of variance that each variable explains. We also 
obtain the response of the economic growth rate to one standard deviation of 
government civilian and military expenditures for the following twenty years. We 
report results for periods of one, two, five, ten, and twenty years. Since the 
innovations are not necessarily uncorrelated, the residuals are orthogonalized using 
the Choleski decomposition in order to obtain a diagonal covariance matrix of the 
resulting innovations and to isolate the effects of each variable on economic 
growth.  
Table 5 presents the proportions of the forecast-error variance of economic 
growth that are attributable to its own random innovation shocks and to those of 
government civilian and military expenditures. The main results in Tables 5 and 6 
can be summarized as follows: 
(a) Nonmilitary expenditures in Egypt explain 6% of the forecast-
error variance of economic growth in the first period and 
about 9% in each year thereafter (Table 5). From the IRF 
results of Table 6, the economic growth responses to 
nonmilitary expenditure shocks are positive in the early 
periods but become negative after seven years with decreasing 
magnitude. In the case of Israel, these shocks cause positive 
responses that are strong in the first five years, explaining 
about 20% of the forecast-error variance of growth in each of 
the two first periods but converge to about 3% after 10 years. 
In the case of Syria, impulse responses of real economic 
growth to shocks in nonmilitary expenditures are all negative, 
explaining about 2% of forecast-error variance of economic 
growth in the first two periods and converge to about 7% after 
5 periods. 
(b) Unlike the impulse responses of economic growth to shocks in 
government civilian expenditures, impulse responses to 
military burdens are all negative for all three countries starting 
in the first period. The military burden explains an annual 
±70% average of the forecast-error variance of economic 
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growth in the case of Egypt. Convergence to this level is very 
fast as we can see from Table 5, where the proportion 
explained in the first period is 69%. In the case of Israel, a 
shock to its military burden explains about 23% of forecast-
error variance of economic growth in each of the first two 
years but this percentage grows to 70% in the fifth year and 
converges to about 95% in less than twenty years. In the case 
of Syria, the proportion of variance explained by the military 
burden grows from 8% in the first year to 17% in the second 
period reaching 59% in ten years.  
(c) The forecast-error variances2 of military burdens are mostly 
explained by their own previous shocks in Israel and in Syria 
but less than 50% of that variance is explained by its own 
previous shocks in the case of Egypt and about 30% is 
explained by shocks to government civilian expenditures.  
This result shows that while military expenditures seem to be exogenous and 
independent of economic growth and civilian expenditures in Israel and Syria, in 
Egypt these two variables constrain the military burden. One possible explanation 
is that Israel and Syria are still the two major parties of the Israeli-Arab conflict, 
and therefore each country sees the increase of military expenditures in the other 
country as a threat to its own security and reacts by increasing military 
expenditures. This is not the case for Egypt, which signed a peace treaty with 
Israel in 1979, and therefore does not consider itself as an active partner in the 
conflict.  
     
                                 
2
 The results are not reported here to save space. 
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Concluding Remarks 
Our aim in this study was to see if there is a causal relationship between 
government expenditures, both the civilian and military components, and economic 
growth in three MENA countries wherein governments play major roles in the 
economies and large proportions of spending go to the military. Since government 
spending is believed to underlie the macroeconomic instability and low growth 
rates in these countries during the past three decades, we examined the effect of 
reducing government expenditures and/or reallocating them to see if this would 
lead to higher economic growth rates Since these economies are among those with 
the highest military burdens, we were particularly interested to determine if they 
would reap peace dividends by reducing military spending.  
Our results show that when considering overall government expenditures, 
there is a bidirectional causality between government spending and economic 
growth, with a negative long-run relationship in the cases of Israel and Syria, and 
a unidirectional negative short-run causality from economic growth to government 
spending in the case of Egypt. Further investigation revealed that military burdens 
might be the cause of these findings. To test for this hypothesis, we broke down 
overall government expenditures into civilian and military expenditures and tested 
for causality within a trivariate framework. In all cases, military burdens 
negatively affected economic growth; civilian government spending positively 
affected economic growth in Israel and Egypt but negatively affected long-run 
economic growth in Syria. Military spending was found to be exogenous both to 
government civilian expenditures and economic growth. This result supports earlier 
findings that military burdens in Middle Eastern countries are not determined by 
economic factors but rather by the geopolitical situation in the area.  
To further support our findings beyond the sample period we decomposed 
the forecast-error variance of each of the three variables and obtained their 
impulse response functions to exogenous shocks on the other two variables. The 
results confirm our Granger causality findings within the sample period.  
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The implications of our analysis are straightforward: Egypt, Israel, and Syria 
could reap peace dividends by reducing their military burdens. However, the effect 
of channeling the freed resources to civilian uses on economic growth is not as 
clear as the direct effect. In the cases of Egypt and Israel, shifting resources from 
military to civilian spending seems to enhance long-run economic growth; in the 
case of Syria resources must be reallocated from unproductive civilian activities to 
productive ones in order to foster economic growth. Therefore, reallocating 
resources from military to civilian spending may not result in increased growth 
unless the civilian allocation favors productive activities. 
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 Table 1 - ADF Unit Root Test Results 
 
LGDP, LGY, LMY, LCGY are the natural logarithms of real GDP, the natural logarithm of ratio of total 
nominal government expenditures to nominal GDP, the natural logarithm of the military burden, and the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of government civilian expenditures to GDP, respectively. 
§ The lag lengths that were chosen by Akaike’s selection criterion did not guarantee white noise 
residuals, therefore the reported lag lengths were chosen to guarantee white noise in residuals.  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
LM(4) is the Lagrange Multiplier test for up to fourth-order serial correlation in the residuals, which is 
asymptotically distributed 
2
)4(χ
. 
 
Country Variable ADF with trend and intercept 
 
 Levels First differences 
 
 ADF k LM(4) ADF k LM(4) 
Egypt LGDP -4.29*** 0 3.691 -4.02*** 1 1.553 
1975-
1998 
LGY -3.12 6 6.420 -5.23*** 0 3.185 
 
LCGY -3.48*§ 4 4.926 -9.36*** 0 5.019 
 
LMY -2.23 1 6.974 -3.87*** 0 1.669 
Israel LGDP -3.148 1 2.791 -3.541** 1 7.322 
1967-
1998 
LGY -2.11 0 3.312 -6.80*** 0 2.142 
 
LCGY -1.98 0 3.248 -6.66*** 0 2.376 
 
LMY -2.51 1 4.574 -7.08*** 0 3.892 
Syria LGDP -1.49§ 3 2.559 -4.75*** 0 6.400 
1973-
1998 
LGY -2.98 0 0.164 -5.11*** 0 5.987 
 
LCGY -3.55 0 1.561 -5.70*** 0 3.622 
 
LMY -1.79§ 2 5.625 -4.44*** 1 2.074 
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Table 2 - Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
Variables λmax P* r* Cointegration Equation 
 r = 0 r = 1    
Israel 1967-98      
LGDP, LGY 36.01 *** 0.25 1 1 LGYLGDP 84.131.19 −=  
LGDP, LCGY, LMY 35.77 *** 6.10 4 1 LMYLCGYLGDP 25.255.123.12 −+=  
LGDP, LCGY, LMY, IL87 35.83 *** 8.22 4 1 LMYLCGYLGDP 34.252.158.12 −+=  
Syria 1973-98      
LGDP, LGY 15.92** 0.28 1 1 LGYLGDP 87.032.14 −=  
LGDP, LCGY, LMY 21.38 ** 7.96 1 1 LMYLCGYLGDP 42.037.045.13 −−=  
 
LGDP, LGY, LMY, LCGY are the natural logarithms of real GDP, the natural logarithm of ratio of total 
nominal government expenditures to nominal GDP, the natural logarithm of the military burden, and the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of government civilian expenditures to GDP, respectively. 
 
*; **; *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
λmax is the maximum eigenvalue statistic. 
p* represents the optimal lag length based on AIC from the unrestricted VAR model.  
r* is the number of cointegration vectors based on Johansen’s method. 
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Table 3 - Results of Granger Causality Tests  
     Bivariate Causality between LGY and LGDP 
    Independent Variables LM(4) 
Country Method Dependent 
Variable 
p ECM
-1 ∆LGDP ∆LGY  
Egypt SGC LGDP∆  1     0.09 4.79 
 
 
LGY∆  1   7.57 ***   
Israel ECM LGDP∆  0 -0.046***   2.38 
 
 
LGY∆  0 -0.086**    
Syria ECM LGDP∆  0 -0.165***   2.33 
 
 
LGY∆  0 -0.209**    
Notes: 
LGDP, LGY, LMY, LCGY are the natural logarithms of real GDP, the natural logarithm of ratio of total 
nominal government expenditures to nominal GDP, the natural logarithm of the military burden, and the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of government civilian expenditures to GDP, respectively. 
The values in the ECM column are the coefficients of the error correction terms in the relevant equation. 
The numerical entries in the columns of LGY  and LGDP ∆∆  are the Wald test statistic values for 
testing the null hypotheses that all coefficients of the lags of these variables in the equation of the 
dependent variable are zeroes. 
*; **; *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Lag lengths of the three variables were determined using Akaike’s information criterion with maximum 
lags of 4 allowed for each variable. 
 
LM(4) is the Lagrange Multiplier test for up to the fourth-order serial correlation in the residuals, which 
is asymptotically distributed 2 )4(χ .  
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Table 4 - Results of Granger Causality Tests (Trivariate Analysis) 
 LGDP, LCGY, and LMY  
    
Independent Variables LM(4) 
Country Method 
Dependent 
variable 
k ECM-1 ∆LGDP ∆LCGY ∆LMY  
Egypt SGC ∆LGDP  4   9.20 * 0.43 13.93 
 
  
∆LCGY  4  8.08 *  5.36  
 
  ∆LMY  4  6.99 4.63   
Israel ECM ∆LGDP  3 -0.08 ***  12.70 *** 16.43 *** 5.21 
 
  
∆LCGY  3 0.32 *** 18.84 ***  10.46 ***  
 
  ∆LMY  3 0.07 6.26 * 8.22 **   
Syria  ECM ∆LGDP  0 -0.18 ***    8.72 
  
  
∆LCGY  0 -0.50 ***     
 
  ∆LMY  0 -0.12     
 
LGDP, LGY, LMY, LCGY are the natural logarithms of real GDP, the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
total nominal government expenditures to nominal GDP, the natural logarithm of the military burden, and 
the natural logarithm of the ratio of government civilian expenditures to GDP, respectively. 
The values in the ECM column are the coefficients of the error correction terms in the relevant equation. 
The numerical entries in the columns of ∆LGDP, ∆LCGY, and ∆LMY are the Wald test statistic values 
for testing the null hypotheses that all coefficients of the lags of these variables in the equation of the 
dependent variable are zeroes. 
*; **; *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Lag lengths of the three variables were determined using Akaike’s AIC method, with maximum lags of 4 
allowed for each variable. 
 
LM(4) is the Lagrange Multiplier test for up to the fourth-order serial correlation in the residuals, which 
is asymptotically distributed 2 )9(χ  
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Table 5 - Variance Decomposition of ∆LGDP (%) 
Years Egypt Israel  Syria Egypt Israel  Syria 
Percentage of forecast-error variance 
explained by ∆LCGY 
Percentage of forecast-error variance 
explained by ∆LMEY 
 
5.64 20.45 0.11 68.94 23.84 8.32 
 
8.95 16.96 1.87 68.69 23.11 16.74 
 
10.09 6.67 5.63 70.60 70.20 39.91 
10 8.79 2.71 7.26 74.37 88.84 59.05 
20 9.09 2.57 7.86 73.89 94.70 70.72 
 
The results are based on an unrestricted three-variable VAR system of LGDP, LCGY, and LMEY. 
 
Table 6 - Impulse-Response Function of ∆LGDP (1x10-3 standard deviation) 
Years Egypt Israel  Syria Egypt Israel  Syria 
∆LGDP response to a shock on ∆LCGYLGDP response to a shock on ∆LMEY
 
6.3 10.3 1.8 22.0 11.1 15.6 
 
8.2 7.2 9.8 18.4 9.6 25.6 
 
5.3 2.5 15.3 13.8 30.6 41.6 
10 0.6 2.6 16.2 8.00 34.0 49.4 
20 1.2 7.4 17.1 4.4 44.4 53.3 
 
The results are based on an unrestricted three-variable VAR system of LGDP, LCGY, and LMEY. 
 
